Measuring the Success of the Presidency of the Council of the EU - Austria and Croatia in Comparative Perspective by Igor Vidačak & Tomislav Milošić
32
Key words:  





















This paper aims to contribute to the ongoing debate on criteria 
for measuring the performance of the rotating Presidencies of the 
Council of the EU. The comparison between Austria and Croatia, two 
countries that concluded the two most recent Council Presidency 
Trios, can be illustrative in identifying the main factors that can 
influence the overall performance of rotating Presidencies. Based on 
the series of quantitative and qualitative indicators, the overall score 
of both countries’ Presidencies turned to be positive, despite some 
failures of these Presidencies to demonstrate a firm commitment 
to fundamental EU values. In view of the lack of evaluations of the 
Council Presidencies based on verifiable, measurable indicators, this 
paper seeks to contribute to the development of a more objective 
methodological framework for the assessment of the future 
Presidencies of the Council as a still under-researched area within 
EU studies.  
Measuring the Success of the 
Presidency of the Council of 
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Introduction
Since the establishment of the six-month rotating 
Presidencies of the Council of the EU by Rome Treaties in 1957, 
the need for strengthening the leadership in the Council has 
been continuously growing. The ever-increasing complexity 
of the EU decision-making procedures, the substantial 
widening of the scope of EU competences, the progressive 
extension of co-legislative powers of the European Parliament 
and successive enlargements to new Member States had a 
significant impact on the EU inter-institutional dynamics. The 
search for compromise over new policy solutions has become 
very long and challenging, with the average time required 
for a first-reading agreement in the Council in the ordinary 
legislative procedure being about fifteen months (van Gruisen 
2019). It is in this context that the role of the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU has been considered essential in leading 
and concluding negotiations on priority legislative and policy 
dossiers, shaping the EU agenda, as well as striking the right 
balance between often divergent Member State preferences, 
institutional interests and strategies. While the Lisbon Treaty 
has taken away some responsibilities of the Presidency of the 
Council of the EU by separating it from that of the European 
Council, chaired by the Permanent President, and introducing 
the permanent chair of the Foreign Affairs Council headed by 
the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 
its role in managing the EU legislative process and promoting 
equal representation of all Member States in the Council 
remains crucial. 
Despite the undeniable importance of the Council rotating 
Presidencies, the assessment of their performance has only 
rather recently attracted the interest of researchers. The 
attempts to introduce more clarity into the analysis of the 
success or influence of the Council Presidency in fulfilling 
its main tasks set by the treaties have generated a number of 
different approaches to this topic within the community of 
EU scholars. There is still no consensus on the main indicators 
for assessing or measuring the Presidency’s performance. 
Besides, there is still a general lack of comparative studies 
of different Presidencies that would be based on a clear 
analytical framework. In addition, the search for an objective 
methodological framework for measuring the results of the 
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number of internal and external factors such as different 
circumstances in the EU and Member States (e.g. national or 
European elections), the variety of state structures (unitary 
or federal) and national public administration traditions 
and capacities, pressures or the lack of support from key 
institutions or stakeholders, but also developments at the 
global, international level (e.g. economic or pandemic crisis).
In view of the lack of standardised criteria or indicators that 
can tell us if the Presidency was successful, but also taking 
into account the general lack of debate on factors that affect 
the overall performance of the Council six-month Presidencies, 
this paper aims to contribute to the development of a more 
precise conceptual framework for measuring the performance 
of the rotating Presidencies of the Council of the EU. The main 
research question is: which indicators can be used to determine 
whether the Presidency of the Council of the European Union 
was successful or not? In addition, the paper will explore what 
the factors that influence the overall performance of the 
rotating Presidencies of the Council are, but also under which 
conditions the policy consistency over consecutive Presidency 
terms can be ensured, particularly in case of complex policies 
such as the EU enlargement.
The methodological justification for selecting Austria and 
Croatia for comparison in this paper is based on several 
reasons. Both countries concluded the last two consecutive Trio 
Presidencies of the Council. They also had the EU enlargement 
policy as one of their political priorities. In addition, they do not 
represent an extreme in any significant parameter that could 
predetermine their performance as the Presidency. On the other 
hand, it could be significant that Austria held the Presidency in 
the second half of 2018 for the third time, while Croatia held 
the Presidency for the first time in the first half of 2020. The 
said may also contribute to the debate on the differences in the 
performance of old and new EU Member States.
The first part of the paper provides an overview of different 
approaches to studying the Council Presidency. Then, as a 
starting point of the research, the paper will elaborate on 
the relevant roles and duties of the Presidency. In the next 
step, the identified groups of roles will be translated into 
criteria for a successful Presidency. Furthermore, within each 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
32-63
clarification of assessment benchmarks. In that context, the 
successful Presidency will be described as a positive assessment 
of fulfilling the roles of the Presidency in accordance with 
the proposed framework of performance indicators where a 
positive score for each indicator represents one step closer to the 
concept of a successful Presidency. The performance of selected 
countries will be assessed based on the proposed framework of 
indicators, with special emphasis on the enlargement policy 
as a common top priority of both Presidencies. Finally, some 
reflections on the limitations of the research will be presented, 
followed by concluding remarks with summary of key findings 
and ideas for future research in this area.
Evolving research and different approaches to studying the 
Council Presidency
In the literature on the European Union, there has been an 
obvious research gap regarding the Council, which was partly 
justified by the traditional lack of transparency within that 
particular EU institution. Since the late 1990s, the Council 
started to open its doors to the public and researchers, and 
that might be one of the reasons why the Council and the 
Presidency of the Council came relatively late to the focus of 
interest of political scientists. A wide spectrum of approaches 
to analysing continuous negotiation, bargaining, coalition-
building and compromise seeking behaviour of Member States 
in the Council has started to be developed, highlighting a 
number of dilemmas and contradictions related to the Council 
and the Presidency position. Following the initial academic 
contributions on the Council and the Presidency (Edwards and 
Wallace 1977; de Bassompierre 1988; Kirchner 1992), over the 
years a number of authors added new dimensions to the study of 
the Presidency in terms of the methods and empirical analysis 
used, bringing some valuable insights for future evaluations 
of the Presidency’s performance (Schout 1998; Elgström 2003; 
Tallberg 2003; Thomson 2008).
In general, the predominant focus of these studies was on 
the extent of the Presidency’s influence in intergovernmental 
negotiations within the Council, but with somewhat different 
conclusions. Firstly, scholars have different views on whether 
the presiding Member State has any additional power and 
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If the Presidency has some instruments in possession, formal 
or rather informal ways of exerting influence, another point of 
divergence is the extent to what the presiding Member State, in 
reality, does it. Finally, scholars may have different conclusions 
when it comes to the evaluation of one Presidency’s attempts 
at exerting additional influence. Unfortunately, research on 
measuring the success of the Presidency’s performance, using 
standardised indicators applied to more than one or two 
Presidencies has been rather neglected.
Some studies approach the Presidency mostly through its 
administrative role of the chair of numerous meetings without 
any additional influence, apart from what that specific Member 
State has according to its voting weight or bargaining capacity. 
This perspective is supported in earlier academic works on the 
Council and in recent times by Schout (1998), who argues that 
“the conflicting demands imposed on Member States holding 
the Presidency (...) have limited the influence of the Presidency” 
(1998: 2). Schalk et al. (2007: 230) add a few more arguments in 
favour of the Presidency failing to influence the Council’s work, 
namely the shortness of the rotating Presidency (six months), 
dealing with ongoing issues that were inherited from previous 
Presidencies and responding to external, unpredictable events.
Another perspective is somewhat more optimistic when it 
comes to the Presidency’s ability to make a difference in the 
Council’s work. The conventional depiction of the Presidency 
as responsabilité sans pouvoir (Dewost 1984) is increasingly 
challenged by authors who argue that the Presidency can 
have a crucial influence in the decision-making process in the 
Council (Tallberg 2003, 2004; Thomson 2008), especially in the 
context of agenda-shaping. In this context, threefold agenda-
shaping in the Council is explored by authors who focus on the 
Presidency’s power to put specific issues on the agenda, speed 
up or slow down some processes by adjusting the agenda or 
excluding some issues from the agenda (Tallberg 2003). Some 
authors have discussed the balance between the “European” 
and “national” elements of the Council, as well as dilemmas 
on utilising the presiding position in the Council to put on the 
EU agenda some domestically salient issues and for brokering 
deals between the Member States that are somewhat closer to 
particular national preferences (Svetličič and Cerjak 2015).
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single Presidency evaluations offer some criteria that were used 
to assess how successful those Presidencies were (Karolewski 
et al. 2015; Agh 2012; Heywood 2011), few studies comparing 
different presidencies (Quaglia and Moxon-Browne 2006; 
Bengtsson, Elgström and Tallberg 2004), but also evaluating 
Trio Presidencies (Batory and Puetter 2013).
All of the above-mentioned research seems to lack the 
universality of the used criteria. Moreover, it needs to address 
the common misconception of the Presidency’s success 
and the Presidency’s influence being used interchangeably 
(Vandacasteele and Bossuyt 2014). The possibility of using the 
presiding place in the Council for exerting more influence 
cannot be regarded as a sole indicator of the Presidency’s 
performance, nor can it be misinterpreted as a sole indicator 
of the Presidency’s success. In this research, a possible increased 
influence of the Presidency is incorporated in one of the 
Presidency’s roles, where it can use its position at the helm of 
the Council, as well as a more significant influence that comes 
with it, to impose discussion on domestically salient issues.
Analytical framework – translating Presidency roles into 
criteria and indicators for performance measurement
Although the EU founding treaties do not explicitly 
mention the roles of the Presidency, scholars have examined 
the Council’s work in the past decades and many of them list 
a certain number of roles that are connected to the post of the 
Presidency. One of the most detailed lists of the Presidency’s role 
was proposed by Hayes-Renshaw and contained the following 
nine tasks: 1) acting in accordance with the Presidency Trio’s 
programme, 2) chairing both formal and informal meetings 
of the Council, 3) chairing all the meetings of lower-ranking 
preparatory bodies (COREPER I and II, numerous working 
groups), 4) providing appropriate discussion environment in 
the Council meetings, 5) cooperating with the President of the 
European Council and the High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, 6) acting as spokesperson for the 
Council, 7) contacting and negotiating with the Parliament 
and the Commission in trialogues, 8) meeting all of the 
Council’s obligations, 9) reaching an agreement on certain 
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This research combines the main components of the 
approaches to the Presidency’s roles which sum up key roles 
mentioned in relevant literature, especially in an article by 
Quaglia and Moxon-Browne as well as in the one by Schout and 
Vanhoonacker, both published in 2006. Both of these articles use 
the Presidency’s roles to create criteria for further evaluation 
of the Presidency’s success. Also, they both extract four groups 
of roles that encompass, in their opinion, the scope of the 
Presidency’s work. Additionally, these authors have highlighted 
remarkably similar groups of roles, but with slightly different 
tasks within each group. The main difference is that Schout and 
Vanhoonacker (2006), unlike Quaglia and Moxon-Browne (2006), 
have included the roles which go hand in hand with the mere 
fact that the presiding Member State is still a Member State of 
the Council and it cannot disregard its national preferences 
during that period.
Building upon the methodological approaches of the above-
mentioned authors, for this research, five groups of roles will 
be established, combining the two approaches above, thus 
addressing the issue of competing roles and contradiction 
between the “European” and “national” elements of the 
Presidency and the Council.  Observed groups will put a focus 
on the Presidency’s role as: administrative manager, consensus 
seeker, political leader, external and internal representative, and an 
agent of national interests. These five groups sum up most of the 
tasks that a single Presidency needs to deal with while in office. 
Therefore, the evaluation of its performance can be based on 
five criteria, corresponding to five groups of roles, with a set of 
related qualitative and quantitative indicators.
Similar to the already mentioned methodological approaches, 
the first group of roles (Presidency as the manager and organiser 
of the Council work) includes a rather broad scope of tasks. These 
tasks can seem as simple as arranging the meeting rooms, but 
they can also be as complex as agenda structuring and devising 
a strategy for moving forward with a legislative file. What the 
earlier authors did not explicitly include in any of the groups is 
the role of securing continuity of the Council’s work, which is 
crucial for the Council’s credibility. Hosli et al. (2011) reckon that 
a “lion’s share of the Presidency’s time and resources are spent 
on administrative tasks - the ongoing Council business” (2011: 
230). Another reason why securing continuity is a major part of 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
32-63
policies that were inherited from previous Presidencies (Schalk 
et al. 2007: 230). This is especially important in the context of the 
Trio Presidencies introduced by the Lisbon Treaty requiring a 
close collaboration of three Member States’ Presidencies during 
an 18-month period, which opened a number of challenges in 
balancing between the implicit diversity and the need for policy 
consistency in consecutive Council presidencies (Batory and 
Puetter 2013). This group of criteria is related to the adoption 
of legislative acts as one of the primary tasks of the Council, 
with a measurable indicator of Presidency performance, i.e. 
the number of legislative files agreed in the first or second 
reading under the ordinary legislative procedure. Taking into 
account the average number of legislative files concluded by 
various presidencies in the last five years (since the start of 
counting of trilogues as important catalysts of the legislative 
process), high or above-average performance is proposed to 
be considered for more than 40 concluded legislative files, 
an average performance for above 20 and a low score would 
be for Presidencies closing less than 20 legislative files. In 
addition, the second measurable indicator deals with the 
number of adopted Council conclusions, indicating the 
Presidency’s capacity to maintain internal dynamics of the 
Council activities and potential for securing the support of 
other Member States for topics of common interest. Similar to 
the previous indicator, the baseline will be established as the 
average number of Council conclusions adopted in the last five 
years (for the last ten Council presidencies), where the high 
(above average) performance will be marked by more than 50 
adopted Council conclusions, average performance by above 25 
and low performance by below 25 Council conclusions.
Presidency as a consensus seeker represents the second group 
of roles that will be regarded in this research. As mentioned 
before, the ongoing negotiations in the Council can be 
described as consensus-driven, which means that Member 
States are encouraged to behave constructively, striving with 
other Member States to reach an agreement and to overcome 
different policy preferences to strike a deal. In order to achieve 
success in this task, some scholars claim that the Presidency 
has to, at least temporarily, put aside its national preferences 
and persist in “trying to find solutions that the majority of 
Member States can accept” (Hosli et al. 2011: 230). The ability to 
reach a compromise entails a neutral and impartial position of 
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99), otherwise, the Presidency can be labelled as incapable. From 
the agent-principal perspective, brokerage and impartiality is a 
service that the presiding Member State is expected to deliver 
to its colleagues in the Council (Vandecasteele and Bossuyt 2014: 
237). A measurable indicator for this group of Council roles 
would be the increase in the share of unanimous decisions in 
the Council.
The third set of roles, Presidency as a political leader, is 
substantially based on the Presidency’s capacity to steer the EU’s 
political direction in accordance with the proclaimed political 
guidelines. This role of the Presidency might seem undermined 
by the institutionalisation of the European Council and its 
Permanent President. However, the Presidency can still have 
enough political space to showcase political leadership. The 
Presidency as a political leader is expected to devote its full-time 
attention to common, European issues and seek sustainable 
solutions. Furthermore, an important part of acting as a 
political leader is the ability to give an immediate and adequate 
response to any external event that has a significant impact for 
the Council’s work and for the Union in general (Schalk et al. 
2007: 230; Vandecasteele and Bossuyt 2014: 239-240).
Presidency as an internal and external representative of the 
Council makes up the fourth group of the Presidency’s 
roles. Despite previously mentioned institutional changes 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, the Presidency’s role as an 
external representative retains its importance in certain 
policy areas. For instance, the Presidency represents the 
Council when negotiating trade deals with third countries 
or when negotiating with the EU candidate countries in the 
enlargement process. The Presidency’s commitment to EU 
values contributes to the overall EU credibility in external 
relations – therefore, that will be the focus of a qualitative 
indicator in this group of roles. Regarding the internal 
representation, the most prominent role of the Presidency is 
to represent the Council in the procedure of inter-institutional 
negotiations (trilogues) during the ordinary legislative 
procedure. Also, it is extremely important for the Presidency 
to approach other EU institutions, especially the Commission 
(due to its exclusive right of initiative), and to foster cooperative 
relations with them (Tallberg 2003: 7). In that context, the 
number of trilogues held during the Presidency will be 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
32-63
Lastly, the fifth group of roles of the Presidency (Presidency as an 
agent of national interests) is comprised of different tasks that 
the presiding Member State is expected to complete based solely 
on the fact that it is still one of the Member States in the Council. 
Member States’ objective is to represent their national interests, 
and the Presidency is no exception there. In this multi-faceted 
position, “Member States holding the Presidency are conceived 
of as strategic actors, seeking to satisfy national preferences 
within the confines of their formally delegated role” (Tallberg 
2003: 5). In this context, the coalition-building potential of 
the Presidency on EU policies will be assessed by using the EU 
Coalition Explorer Survey regularly published by the European 
Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR). Besides, the performance 
of the Presidency in pursuing key Presidency priorities that are, 
for the purpose of this paper, considered as national priorities, 
will be assessed.
Each of the mentioned groups of roles is translated into a list of 
five criteria that need to be fulfilled by the Presidency in order 
to be assessed as successful. Accordingly, the Presidency needs 
to be (1) a successful administrative manager and organiser of 
the Council and (2) it needs to put effort into seeking consensus. 
Also, the Presidency will be deemed as successful if (3) it acts 
as a political leader of the Council. Furthermore, a successful 
Presidency needs to (4) properly represent the Council both 
internally and externally, and finally, (5) it needs to fulfil 
expectations of acting as an agent of its national interests.
As there are many factors that can contribute to the Presidency’s 
performance, at least according to the existing literature, they 
sometimes seem rather simplistic, and, on the other hand, they 
sometimes collide with one another. In order to overcome these 
limitations, two points are detected within each criterium 
considered to be crucial for a successful Presidency, which 
leads to the total number of ten indicators (Table 1). Certain 
contradictions might still come up, especially regarding the 
complexity of the assessment of certain indicators, such as 
neutrality and impartiality on one hand, and prioritising 
national interests on the other. However, these examples 
of complexity and contradiction should be regarded as an 
inevitable consequence of the Presidency’s two-headed position.
Each indicator comes with three assessment benchmarks 
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benchmark (“0”) comes from a more minimalistic perspective 
on the Presidency’s success as it neither counts for a more 
successful Presidency  nor  does it mean complete failure in that 
matter. After assessing the fulfilment of each indicator with “1”, 
“0”, or “-1”, the scores are added up and divided by the number 
of indicators (10) to get the average score. On a scale from -1 to 
1, the average scores from -1 to –0,6 are interpreted as a very 
unsuccessful Presidency, from -0.5 to -0.1 as an unsuccessful 
one, 0 – neither successful nor unsuccessful. In contrast, the 
average scores from 0.1 to 0.5 denote successful Presidency 
and from 0.6 to 1 a very successful Presidency. Presumably, 
the highest average score is reserved for an ideal type of the 
Presidency, as it is almost impossible to get absolutely positive 
assessments of every indicator.
The proposed methodology for scoring and measuring the 
Council Presidency performance is based on a combination 
of quantitative and qualitative indicators. Certain limitations 
of this research are particularly related to the qualitative 
dimension of the Presidency performance assessment, which 
was based on the data collected from available reports, studies 
and articles. At the same time, the more advanced empirical 
testing of this methodology would require the use of surveys 
among key target groups.
Clearly, the suggested methodological framework cannot fully 
grasp a wide variety of possible internal and external conditions 
which need to be taken into account when attempting to draw 
conclusions on the rotating Presidency success. For example, 
it is very complex to evaluate differences in managing the 
Council Presidency tasks between countries with a federal 
system of political organisation compared to unitary states, as 
well as to analyse the specific role and contribution of federal 
components in shaping the positions of the Presidency. Besides, 
in case of smaller Member States, officials from the General 
Secretariat of the Council or other EU countries can be seconded 
to assist the responsible government bodies of the country 
holding Presidency which can create an additional challenge 
in terms of determining what the “national” presidency is. 
In addition, the success of a Presidency is largely dependent 
on other institutional actors, such as the European Council, 
European Commission and European Parliament. In a year of 
European elections, it can be very demanding for a Presidency 
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managing inter-institutional negotiations with the Parliament 
and the Commission. At the same time, national elections or 
other factors causing the possible instability of the government 
can also be relevant in the evaluation of the performance of a 
Presidency. Therefore, a proper contextualization of a variety 
of external and internal factors should be provided for the 
research findings and data collected based on the proposed set 
of indicators and assessment benchmarks.
44
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Council Presidencies compared: Austria and Croatia
Two Presidencies that concluded the most recent Trio 
Presidencies, Austria and Croatia, are going to be compared 
according to the assessment of their performance as Presidency, 
using the criteria and indicators presented in the previous 
section. Among a number of priorities of both Austrian 
(Eu2018.at, 2018a) and Croatian Presidencies of the Council 
(Vlada Republike Hrvatske 2020b), but also their respective Trio 
Presidencies, the EU enlargement stands out as the common 
priority and will be particularly addressed in the context of this 
assessment.
Starting with the indicator 1.1 (ongoing Council legislative 
affairs), reports have shown mixed results (Liechtenstein 
2018). The Austrian Presidency wanted to use its time in office 
to come to an agreement on particular migration and security 
issues and to finish important files in this policy area. Still, 
it soon became evident that this objective was unrealistic. 
The migration quota system, new Dublin agreement and 
disembarkation platforms outside the EU are just a few of the 
issues that stayed unresolved during the Austrian Presidency 
(Liechtenstein 2018). On the other hand, the Austrian Presidency 
has put additional effort on the enlargement process, more 
specifically on the Western Balkans region, which resulted 
with Serbia and Montenegro opening new negotiation chapters 
(Eu2018.at, 2018b). Furthermore, Austria finalised the work on 
the Erasmus programme and Horizon Europe programme, 
parts of the new Multi-annual Financial Framework 2021-2027 
(Neuper 2019). Altogether, Austria managed to conclude 52 
legislative files in the first reading, out of which 29 at Coreper I, 
19 at Coreper II and 4 at SCA (Special Committee on Agriculture), 
which is an indication of the high performance under this 
quantitative indicator.
The Croatian Presidency’s limited progress in concluding 
legislative files can be explained by exceptional circumstances 
caused by COVID-19 crisis and a sudden shift in political and 
legislative priorities. It was also due to the postponing of the 
agreement on the multi-annual financial framework, which is 
connected to a large number of pending legislative initiatives. 
Out of 19 files concluded in the first reading during the Croatian 
Presidency, 17 files have been related to COVID-19 emergency 
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the Council work during the Croatian presidency (Council 
of the EU 2020a). On the other hand, out of eight inherited 
legislative files which were concluded in the second reading, it 
is important to stress the finalisation of work on the Directive 
on the quality of water intended for human consumption, 
as well as the Directive on markets in financial instruments, 
but also the Regulation on a framework for the recovery and 
resolution of central counterparties. Altogether, 14 legislative 
files were agreed at Coreper I, 12 at Coreper II and one at SCA 
level. The conclusion of 27 legislative files is considered as an 
average performance according to the proposed quantitative 
scoreboard for this indicator. As regards the priority files of the 
Croatian Presidency, in addition to the adoption of the Council 
position on the Conference on the Future of Europe, as well as 
the signing of Brexit agreement, the Decision on opening EU 
accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia has 
been considered as the greatest achievements of the Croatian 
Presidency, marking a substantial shift in the EU enlargement 
policy. On the other hand, no progress has been made on 
asylum and migration package. In contrast, the long-awaited 
deal on the multiannual financial framework has been reached 
only during the German Presidency. The assessment of Croatia’s 
performance as regards the objectives and priorities stated in 
its Presidency Programme showed that 99 out of 174 (or 56.89%) 
legislative and policy activities planned in the Programme had 
been implemented (Vidačak 2020). In general, the assessment of 
the Presidency’s performance in the legislative process based 
only on the quantitative indicator 1.1 has its limitations, mostly 
since it neglects the complexity of certain files, as well as the 
overall political, economic and institutional environment 
for decision-making. This may be illustrated by the impact of 
European elections on the Trio Presidency (Romania, Finland, 
Croatia) where Romania benefited from strong support and 
pressure from the European Commission and the European 
Parliament to reach agreement on eighty priority legislative 
files before the elections, which is almost six times more than 
Finland (Council of the EU 2020b) that was affected by the 
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Regarding the indicator 1.2 during the Austrian Presidency, 56 
conclusions of the Council were adopted (Eu2018.at 2018b), while 
54 conclusions were adopted at the Council sessions during the 
Croatian Presidency (Vlada Republike Hrvatske 2020b). This 
shows that both Presidencies have managed to maintain the 
advanced internal dynamics of the Council activities. Moreover, 
they could both successfully mobilise other Member States to 
support the proposed conclusions and recommendations on 
multiple topics of common interest and regarding the ongoing 
and future policy and legislative initiatives on the agenda of 
EU institutions. Since this was Austria’s third Presidency in 
twenty years, it is reasonable to assume a sufficiently high 
level of expertise of its public administration and no major 
issues during the Presidency regarding its staff competence 
in the European affairs and the capacity to provide technical 
and administrative support to the Council. During the Austrian 
Presidency, 2062 meetings of the Council preparatory bodies 
have been held (Eu2018.at 2018b). The official report of the 
Croatian Presidency mentions 916 meetings of the Council 
working bodies organised during the first half of 2020 (Vlada 
Republike Hrvatske 2020b). This also indicates substantial 
Table 2:  
Number of 
legislative files 
concluded in the 
first or second 
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capacities of the Presidency to ensure adequate coordination of 
technical and administrative support to the Council activities, 
despite unprecedented crisis caused by COVID-19 outbreak and 
the need for rapid adaptation to the new online modes of the 
Council work.
According to voting records from December 2009 to June 2019, 
approximately two-thirds of all decisions (66%) were made 
with the unanimous support of all Member States (Consilium.
europa.eu, 2019). The positive assessment of this indicator would 
mean that the Presidency has managed to increase the share 
of unanimous decisions. If this share decreased, that would 
count for the negative assessment of this indicator. From 1 July 
2018 to 31 December 2018, out of 58 available voting records, 
only 18 voting procedures ended in a public contestation 
of the majority in the Council (Consilium.europa.eu 2019), 
which means that slightly more than two-thirds (68.9%) of all 
decisions were made with unanimous support of the whole 
Council. The Croatian Presidency’s performance in this regard 
was somewhat better, reaching unanimity in 74.68% of voted 
decisions during the first six months of 2020. Hence, Austria 
and Croatia can be considered as successful Presidencies when 
it comes to reaching compromises and consensuses (indicator 
2.1), while the performance of both presidencies was below 
average respective the Trios’ performance in this area.
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As regards the indicator 2.2, there were not any significant 
objections that would imply any kind of breach of neutrality 
and impartiality by the Austrian Presidency. The only objection 
was raised regarding the Austrian Presidency policy approach 
on migration and asylum policy package where its national 
government’s stricter approach caused lot of debates and 
disputes, especially with the European Parliament. Otherwise, 
as it is reported (Liechtenstein 2018), Austrian government 
officials were pretty much aware of the importance of being 
neutral and impartial during the negotiations. The same 
holds to a great extent for the Croatian Presidency. However, its 
neutrality was put into question due to the refusal to put on the 
Council agenda the deterioration of the rule of law, democracy 
and fundamental rights in Hungary, despite the initiative 
of thirteen Member States and the European Parliament’s 
Resolution (Euronews 2020).
The assessment of the indicator 3.1 evaluating the Presidency’s 
responsiveness to major events will mostly be conducted 
regarding Austrian efforts to keep the unity of EU27 in the 
Brexit negotiations. Even though the Brexit talks in the second 
half of 2018 cannot be seen as an unforeseen event, some of the 
obstacles that came up in the way of achieving a withdrawal 
deal with the United Kingdom can be seen as unexpected (for 
example, the internal political situation in the UK or Spanish 
demands on Gibraltar). The Austrian Presidency managed 
to gather all remaining Member States to speak with one 
voice and to send a clear message to London that “the present 
Withdrawal Agreement is not renegotiable” and that “it is now 
up to the United Kingdom to make a clear decision” (Eu2018.at 
2018b). Therefore, when it comes to the Brexit negotiations, the 
Austrian Presidency responded adequately and with no delay. 
The Croatian Presidency was faced with an unprecedented 
major global COVID-19 pandemic crisis which has dramatically 
changed the environment for the work of the EU institutions 
and shifted political priorities. Given the extent of the global 
crisis, the reaction of the Croatian Presidency could be 
considered as adequate in terms of supporting the urgent 
adoption of a package of legislative acts as a response to COVID-
19 outbreak. Another major event was the new EU border crisis 
at the beginning of March 2020 following Turkey’s decision 
to open its borders to Greece and send Syrian refugees to 
Europe. The Croatian Presidency, along with leaders of all EU 
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of unity and readiness to tackle the emerging crisis (Euractiv.
com 2020).
The indicator 3.2 deals with the readiness of the Presidency 
to give precedence to common issues over domestic ones 
and checks for any major domestic interference with the 
Presidency’s task as a political leader of the Council. During 
its presidency, Austria was ruled by a right-wing government, 
consisting of ÖVP (Austrian People’s Party) and FPÖ (Freedom 
Party of Austria), which was not welcomed with much 
enthusiasm in the European Union. On the contrary, the leader 
of ÖVP, Sebastian Kurz, was accused of collaborating with a 
neo-fascist political party and conceding to their demands 
of stricter migration rules and more rigid borders (Shuster 
2018). Due to coalition instability back home, “Austria has been 
preoccupied by itself” (Satanakis 2019) and was therefore not 
able to provide credible and stable leadership of the Council and 
the EU as a whole. The Croatian Presidency was also tarnished 
by giving explicit support to Hungary amid widely expressed 
pan-European concerns over democratic backsliding in that EU 
country during pandemic crisis (Vladisavljević 2020). Thereby, it 
was leaving the impression of worrying more about short term 
national interests – i.e. avoiding being blocked by Hungary in 
its w entry into the Schengen and the OECD.
Regarding the role of internal representative, both presidencies 
will be evaluated according to the number of trilogues held, 
in comparison with the average number of trilogues held 
since the beginning of counting of this form of informal 
inter-institutional negotiations in the ordinary legislative 
procedures, which amounts to 123 (the average number of the 
last ten presidencies). In this context, Austrian performance 
was above average with 150 trilogues held during its Presidency, 
while the Croatian Presidency managed to hold only 31 
trilogues, largely due to COVID-19 outbreak as well as to the 
lack of progress in reaching a political deal on the multiannual 
financial framework which blocked talks on a large number of 
related legislative files. A more advanced approach to assessing 
the cooperation of the Council Presidency with other EU 
institutions might also take into account the number of open 
disputes of the Presidency with other institutions. For example, 
one of the most debated files proposed by the Commission was 
the one on scrapping daylight saving time in the EU. According 
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dissatisfaction with the Council’s postponement of that 
legislation, while the Austrian Presidency insisted on more 
time to be given to the Member States to decide on this issue. 
Regarding the relations of the Presidency with the Parliament, 
one other dispute arose, the one about migration and asylum 
legislative package. Namely, the “Austrian Presidency had 
sent some of the files (those on reception conditions, asylum 
qualification and resettlement) back to the technical level at 
Council for renegotiation” (Eder 2018), thus stopping further 
progress on this issue. Another conflict evolved around the 
UN Migration Compact, as Austria refused to sign it, triggering 
negative comments from the Commission President, Jean-
Claude Juncker (Schaart 2018; Kostaki 2019). The only noticeable 
dispute between the Croatian Presidency and the European 
Parliament was about the Hungary and Poland rule of law 
procedure being ignored by the Presidency. In future research 
on the performance measurement of the Presidency, the 
“internal representation” indicator may be designed as a 
“composite” indicator covering both the number of trilogues 
and the number of open inter-institutional disputes involving 
the Council.
The indicator 4.2 tests the presiding Member State’s compliance 
with the fundamental values and principles of the European 
Union. Even though Austria is regarded as a Member State that 
fully respects fundamental values and principles, Freedom 
House Report for 2018 noted that since the ÖVP-FPÖ coalition 
government took power, there has been a rise in threats to the 
freedom of the press, the politicisation of intelligence agency 
and legislative attempts to deteriorate migrants’ and asylum 
seekers’ rights. According to this report, the assessment is that 
Austria is still a country that complies with the fundamental 
values and principles, but with slight deviations (Freedom 
House 2019). The first European Commission 2020 Report on the 
Rule of Law highlighted challenges with the low perception of 
independence of the judiciary, as well as media freedoms and 
civic space in Croatia (European Commission 2020). As regards 
the prominence of the rule of law topics during the Austrian 
and Croatian Presidencies, both Presidencies did not manage to 
put on the agenda of the Council the cases of serious breaches 
of the rule of law in Hungary, following the procedure launched 
by the Parliament in 2018. As already mentioned, the Croatian 
Presidency came under heavy criticism for ignoring the 









XXVI (87) 2020, 
32-63
deterioration of the rule of law, democracy and fundamental 
rights in Hungary under emergency regime due to pandemic 
crisis (Euobserver.com 2020). The step forward in promoting 
the EU values of transparency and openness was done by the 
Croatian Presidency’s support to the renewal of negotiations on 
the Inter-institutional Agreement on mandatory Transparency 
Register, through a political kick-off meeting held in June 
2020 (Ec.europa.eu 2020), while the message of solidarity and 
unity was sent to Western Balkans countries through Zagreb 
Declaration on EU enlargement (Consilium.europa.eu 2020). The 
Austrian Presidency managed to organise the annual rule of 
law dialogue in the Council (General Affairs) and adopted the 
Presidency Conclusions on “Trust in Public Institutions and the 
Rule of Law”, based on expert inputs from EU Member States, EU 
institutions, the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, the Council 
of Europe, civil society and academia (Council of the EU 2018), 
thus proactively promoting debates on fundamental EU values.
The last group of indicators tests the performance of both 
Presidencies in advocating national interests during their 
Presidency terms and demonstrating the coalition potential 
in the Council. In order to increase the possibility of framing 
some domestic interests as common European interests, 
Member States regularly engage in informal coalition-building 
in the Council. These coalitions can be in the form of bilateral 
cooperation, triads (three Member States together) or hubs of 
one Member State that attracts other Member States as the most 
preferred partner in the Council (Huhe et al. 2018: 30-33) and they 
are often based on either cultural and geographical proximity 
or shared ideology of ruling political parties. According to the 
European Council on Foreign Relations EU Coalition Explorer 
2018 Survey (Ecfr.eu 2018), Austria is part of the “Affluent Seven” 
group, together with Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands and Sweden. This group of Member States 
holds a combined share of 17% of the Union’s GDP (Ecfr.eu 
2018), and thanks to that, these countries are punching above 
their weight when it comes to their importance for forming 
majority or blocking minority in the Council. Therefore, Austria 
has successfully increased its visibility and reputation among 
other Member States. According to the overall results of the ECFR 
Coalition Explorer 2020 Survey conducted during the Croatian 
Presidency in March and April 2020, Croatia ranks 22nd in 
the overall results that combine four criteria (most contacted 
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to work with for EU country’s government, most influential on 
EU policy, sharing longer standing interests on EU policy), while 
Austria ranked 8th (Ecfr.eu 2020).
Finally, the indicator 5.2 is focused on the congruence of 
national and European priority policy areas and the acceptance 
of the Presidency’s approach to the prioritised policy areas. For 
all three priorities of the Austrian Presidency (fight against 
illegal migration, digitalisation, enlargement) the progress 
was moderate. Migration and security have been priority 
policy areas on the European level for a long time now, and 
the Austrian Presidency succeeded in keeping those areas in 
the focus. However, the Presidency tried to make its rather 
hostile stance towards migration and asylum a common EU 
feature. Still, since no further progress was made regarding 
these issues (Eder 2018), it is clear that the Presidency was 
not successful in that matter. European institutions did not 
embrace different, more restrictive, approach to migration. 
Regarding the digitalisation legislative files (such as the 
cybersecurity act, public sector information direction, etc.), 
some progress was made during the Austrian presidency, 
but key acts were adopted only during Romanian Presidency. 
Besides the progress on the EU enlargement policy as one of the 
key priorities for the Austrian Presidency was limited, with two 
new negotiation chapters with Serbia and one with Montenegro 
opened, but no substantial progress on other candidate and 
potential candidate countries. When it comes to elevating the 
Croatian presidency priorities at the EU level (enlargement, 
the Conference on the Future of Europe, Brexit, multiannual 
financial framework), the biggest achievement was made on 
the EU enlargement policy by reaching the agreement of EU 
leaders on starting the negotiations with Albania and North 
Macedonia, getting the support of all EU governments for 
unblocking the EU enlargement policy dialogue and adopting 
Zagreb Declaration on EU-Western Balkans relations. Besides, 
the Council common position on the Conference on the Future 
of Europe was adopted in June 2020, while the Decision on 
concluding the Brexit agreement was adopted by the Council 
by the end of January. The Decision on starting the negotiations 
on new EU-UK partnership agreement was brought by the end 
of February, and four negotiation rounds were held during the 
Croatian Presidency. The Croatian Presidency also achieved 
the progress in negotiations on the multiannual financial 
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2020 during the German Presidency. Under this particular 
indicator, Croatia could be perceived as slightly more effective 





1.1 Ongoing Council legislative affairs 1 0
1.2 Technical and administrative capacity 1 1
2.1 Reaching compromise and consensus 1 1
2.2 Neutrality and impartiality 0 0
3.1 Responsiveness to major political or other events 1 1
3.2 Stability and devotion to common issues -1 -1
4.1 Cooperation with other EU institutions 1 -1
4.2 Maintaining or improving EU reputation in the 
international arena
0 0
5.1 Visibility and preferability as coalition partner on EU 
policies
1 -1
5.2 Elevating national priorities to the European level 0 1
Average score 0.5 0.1
As shown in Table 4, scores for each indicator were added up 
and divided by 10, giving the average score 0.5 for the Austrian 
Presidency, and 0.1 for the Croatian presidency, meaning that 
both could be assessed as successful. However, Table 4 also shows 
that this success varied depending on the different roles of the 
Presidency. While both countries succeeded in fulfilling the 
role of a consensus seeker and responded effectively to major 
events, they also failed to demonstrate a firm commitment 
to the EU values and give precedence to common issues over 
national concerns.
As regards the EU enlargement to Western Balkans as a 
common top priority of both Austria and Croatia and as a 
declared priority of their respective Presidency Trios, it is clear 
that the two recent Trios did not manage to reach a consensus 
and policy consistency over this complex topic. In the case of 
the first Trio, while Bulgaria had invested substantial efforts 
in providing a clear European perspective for the Western 
Balkans countries as its first priority, and organised Sofia 
Western Balkans summit as the central event of its presidency, 
Estonia has instead focused on the Digital Single Market, while 
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invested most of its efforts in the issues of security and fighting 
illegal migration, while simultaneously emphasising the EU 
perspective of the region, as key partners in the managing 
migration crisis.
The context for advocating the progress in this area changed 
dramatically between the Austrian and Croatian Presidencies, 
with a French ultimatum to change the enlargement 
methodology and decision to block the opening of accession 
negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia in October 
2019. While the Romanian Presidency still managed to keep the 
focus on enlargement by negotiating the Council conclusions on 
this topic, Finland’s priorities were directed to other areas, with 
limited opportunity to act during the time of re-structuring of 
the EU institutions following the last EP elections. Given the 
complexity of the challenge of unblocking the French “No” and 
gaining the support of several other EU Member States with 
serious concerns over enlargement, Croatia’s achievement of 
negotiating the Decision on opening negotiations with Albania 
and North Macedonia can be regarded as the most positive 
aspect of its Presidency of the Council. On the other hand, 
despite ambitious declarations in 18-months Trio Presidency 
Programmes, the case of enlargement policy shows that it is 
very challenging to ensure policy consistency over consecutive 
Presidency terms, mostly due to the diversity of interests of 
Member States, the complexity of issues addressed, but also 
increasing difficulties in reaching unanimity on very sensitive 
issues in the Council. 
Limitations: the lack of transparency
This research had to undoubtedly take into consideration 
a serious lack of transparency of the Council’s work, which 
presents a major obstacle for academics who want to examine 
specific issues in the Council more closely. Even though the 
Council has become significantly more transparent in recent 
years (Naurin and Wallace 2008: 2), there are still some important 
information that could be very helpful in pursuing academic 
research of the Council and the Presidency, if revealed. For 
instance, there is no official information on failed decisions 
or on negotiation processes in the lower levels of the Council. It 
could be further discussed what the limits of the Council’s non-
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strike the right balance between secrecy and transparency, in 
order to keep the negotiations ongoing, without any external 
interference, but at the same time informing the public of 
every important step in the decision-making process, in order 
to maintain the trust and legitimacy in the eyes of the public.
This issue proved quite problematic for this research, too. In the 
lack of official documentation, the Presidency’s performance 
had to be evaluated according to some other information sources, 
such as the Presidency’s official publications on its work, media 
and other reports from non-governmental organisations. Every 
Presidency publishes a list of its accomplishments at the end 
of its term, but no Presidency, quite understandably, publishes 
a list of its failures. In order to counterbalance any bias, the 
assessment of the majority of indicators relied extensively on 
media reports on the Presidency and the reports of some other 
non-governmental organisations, like Freedom House or the 
European Council on Foreign Relations.
It is expected that the performance measurement framework 
proposed in this research may contribute to a better 
understanding of the multi-faceted tasks of the Council 
Presidency but also encourage further discussion on the 
criteria and indicators of assessing the success of rotating 
Presidencies. However, any further, in-depth analysis would 
need to be based on a more advanced disclosure of the official 
Council data, covering the Presidency’s work on all decision-
making levels in the Council.
Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper was to detect and systematise 
the roles and tasks of the Presidency and to find out which 
indicators can be used in order to determine whether the 
Presidency’s performance was successful or not. Five groups 
of roles were highlighted as crucial tasks of the Presidency, 
namely acting as an administrative manager of legislative 
files, a consensus seeker, a political leader, an external and 
internal representative, and as an agent of national interests. 
The successful fulfilment of these roles reflected, accordingly, 
the main criteria for a successful Presidency. In order to satisfy 
each specific criterion, ten indicators in total were recognised 
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performance. Each indicator comes with three assessment 
benchmarks (positive, neutral and negative), in order to make 
an overall assessment of the Presidency, either as successful or 
unsuccessful. Furthermore, these indicators were then tested 
on specific cases of both the Austrian and Croatian Presidencies 
of the Council.
Some general conclusions can be drawn from the assessment 
of the Austrian and Croatian Presidencies, according to the 
established quantitative and qualitative indicators. The 
Presidency has a unique position of encompassing both 
European and national elements, and the analysed cases 
do reflect that very contradiction. When it comes to the 
Presidency’s capacity to conclude legislative files, different 
circumstances such as emergency crisis or the complexity of 
political agreement for priority issues addressed can largely 
limit the scope of intervention of the Presidency. While both 
Austria and Croatia can be considered as successful Presidencies 
when it comes to reaching a compromise and consensus in 
the Council as measured by the percentage of unanimous 
decisions, they showed less commitment and consistency in 
promoting and protecting the fundamental EU values and 
prioritising common EU issues over specific domestic concerns. 
The research showed that it was very challenging to ensure 
policy consistency over consecutive Presidency terms and 
within respective Trio Presidencies concluded by Austria and 
Croatia, mostly due to the over-ambitious nature of established 
priorities and increasing difficulties in reaching unanimity on 
very sensitive issues in the Council.
The final scores for both countries obviously do neither reflect 
the multi-dimensional nature of certain roles of the Council, the 
complexity of addressed policy issues, a wide range of external 
and internal conditions affecting its work nor difficulties 
in balancing between the quantitative and qualitative 
aspects of the measurement of the Presidency’s performance. 
Nevertheless, it is expected that the proposed scoreboard will 
provide an impetus to other researchers and practitioners in 
identifying and testing more advanced methodologies for 
evaluation in this area.
With a view to enabling a more detailed assessment of the 
performance of the Council Presidencies based on objective 
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addressed in the forthcoming period, especially the lack of 
transparency of the Council work and still a predominant 
culture of secrecy in inter-institutional negotiations. 
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